INTRODUCTION
In recent times in Australia there have been a number of changes in the leader of the governing party at both Commonwealth and State level, leading to a change in the holder of the office of Prime Minister or Premier. These changes have occurred not as a consequence of retirement or the loss of an election, but because of the loss of support for the leader by the leader's parliamentary party. They include the South Australian change of Premier from Mike Rann to Jay Weatherill, the New South Wales changes of Premier from Morris Iemma to Nathan Rees to Kristina Keneally and the change in Prime Minister from Kevin Rudd to Julia Gillard. Earlier examples include the change from Bob Hawke to Paul Keating and from John Gorton to Billy McMahon. This article explores the connection between the loss of party support for a leader and the role of the Governor or Governor-General in the appointment and removal of the Premier or Prime Minister. 1 When a party loses confidence in its leader, there is usually a leadership challenge and a vote of the parliamentary party, which results in the appointment of a new leader. The former leader then customarily resigns his or her commission as Prime Minister and a new Prime Minister is commissioned. The Governor-General, in assessing who is most likely to hold the confidence of the lower House, will ordinarily choose the person who leads the party or coalition which holds a majority of seats in the lower House. Part II of this article considers the consequences of resignation. In doing so, it addresses two questions. First, does the resignation of a Prime Minister, in such circumstances, entail the resignation of the entire Cabinet? Secondly, is the Governor-General, in commissioning a new Prime Minister, obliged to act upon the advice of the departing Prime Minister as to who should be his or her successor?
Part III of this article considers the position of a Prime Minister who chooses not to resign, despite having lost the leadership of his or her party. This might occur when a _____________________________________________________________________________________ * Professor, University of Sydney Law School. Letters referred to in this article which do not have a public source were either obtained through freedom of information applications or less formal requests to the relevant offices of Premiers or Governors. My thanks to the Commonwealth, New South Wales, South Australian and Tasmanian Governments for providing information and documentary material.
II THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RESIGNATION OF THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT
A The effect of a Prime Minister's resignation on the Ministry 1 Theory When a government is formed after an election, it is an individual who is commissioned by the Governor-General to form a government. The convention which governs the appointment of a Prime Minister obliges the Governor-General to commission the person who holds (or is most likely to hold) the confidence of the lower House. The Governor-General's decision about whom to commission is usually based upon the assumption that the leader of a parliamentary party has the support of all the members of that party in the lower House. If they form a majority, then it is a fair assumption that the leader of that party can form a government that holds the confidence of the lower House.
The person commissioned as Prime Minister to form a government does so by advising the Governor-General on the appointment of Ministers and the allocation of portfolios to particular Ministers. The Prime Minister may also advise the GovernorGeneral on the removal of Ministers, if they do not resign at the Prime Minister's request. 2 The removal of Ministers is not a reserve power -it is a power exercised by 
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331 ____________________________________________________________________________________ the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister. 3 This is because the Prime Minister, while he or she holds his or her commission, is the person responsible for forming the government and advising upon its constitution.
If a Prime Minister resigns following the defeat of his or her government at an election or a defeat in the lower House that indicates a loss of confidence, then the Prime Minister's resignation has the effect of terminating the commissions of all other Ministers (subject to Ministers carrying on in a caretaker capacity until a new government is sworn into office). If the Prime Minister dies or resigns for personal reasons or because he or she has lost the confidence of the governing party, there are mixed views as to the consequences for the rest of the Ministry.
Some have taken the view that a ministry is automatically terminated by the resignation or death of the Prime Minister 4 (subject again to continuation in office until a new leader is chosen and a new ministry formed, as the country can never be without a government). This is because the ministry is appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister and its existence is dependent upon the operation of the Prime Minister's commission to form a government. A new Prime Minister, operating pursuant to a new commission, must form his or her own government. As the Canadian Privy Council Office put it in the Manual of Official Procedures of the Government of Canada: 5 The Prime Minister's resignation from office brings about the resignation of all ministers and of the Government. Whether the Prime Minister's resignation follows a defeat in the House or at the polls or is for personal or other reasons the life of the ministry is terminated with the formal acceptance of his resignation. Individual ministers however continue in office until the new Government is formed. … The Government is identified with the Prime Minister and cannot exist without him. He alone is responsible for recommending who will be appointed ministers. He can recommend their replacement or dismissal and he can bring about the resignation of the whole Government by his own resignation.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
(Ottawa, 1968) 338, <http://jameswjbowden.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/ manual-ofofficial-procedure-of-the-goc.pdf>. In the UK dismissal is usually regarded as an implied resignation: I Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge University Press, 3 rd ed, 1961) 83.
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Others have argued that where the resignation is 'personal', 6 such as a retirement, the government as a whole does not vacate office. 7 This view tends to be based more on the notion of party governance -that it is a particular political party that forms the government and that the Prime Minister is simply one member of this government whose departure does not affect its continuing existence. Hence the Prime Minister is commissioned to form the government, but that government may continue to exist without the Prime Minister, until terminated by defeat.
Some of the confusion about the issue is related to the need for ministers to continue in office until a new ministry is appointed. If a Prime Minister's resignation or death were immediately to terminate all ministerial offices, then the country or State would potentially be left without a government, which would be extremely problematic. 8 In the United Kingdom, for example, after the Brown Government failed to win a majority in the 2010 general election, the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, wanted to resign as Prime Minister even though the Conservatives and the LiberalDemocrats had not yet completed negotiations on a coalition. He apparently advised the Queen's Private Secretary that he wished to tender his resignation, but was told that the Queen would not accept it. Her Private Secretary apparently advised: 'The Prime Minister has a constitutional obligation, a duty, to remain in his post until the Queen is able to ask somebody … to form an administration'. He was told that he would have to wait longer until the political situation became clearer. 9 This problem arose because it was assumed, and presumably intended, that Brown's resignation would take immediate effect, including the resignation of the entire ministry.
In Australia, this problem is avoided by the custom and practice that the resignation of a Prime Minister or Premier and that of their ministry, only takes effect once a new head of government is commissioned to form a government. For example, the letter of resignation of Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister stated that the resignation was to take effect upon the appointment of Ms Gillard to the office of Prime Minister. 10 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 6
For a discussion of the circumstances in which a resignation is 'personal', see See the discussion in Canada of cases where this had occurred prior to 1920. The practice was then changed so that the Prime Minister's resignation would not be given 'formal effect until his successor is ready to take over': Privy Council Office, above n 2, 453-5. See also Mallory, above n 4, 83.
9
Anthony Seldon and Guy Lodge, Brown at No 10 (Biteback Publishing, 2010) 460. Cf The Cabinet Manual of the United Kingdom which records at [2.10] that it remains a matter for the Prime Minister 'to judge the appropriate time at which to resign' but that recent examples 'suggest that previous Prime Ministers have not offered their resignations until there was a situation in which clear advice could be given to the Sovereign on who should be asked to form a government'. The Manual notes that it 'remains to be seen whether or not these examples will be regarded in future as having established a constitutional convention.': United Kingdom Cabinet Office, above n 3.
10
Letter from Kevin Rudd to the Governor-General, 24 June 2010.
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This avoids the transitional problems and ensures that a government is always in existence.
The question of whether the resignation of a head of government includes that of the whole ministry has been litigated in Malaysia. In 1994, the Chief Minister of the State of Sabah, Datuk Pairin, tendered his resignation after a number of members of his party defected to an opposition party and a majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly petitioned the Governor to demand Datuk Pairin's resignation as Chief Minister. A new Chief Minister and Cabinet were subsequently appointed. The Plaintiff, who was a Minister in Datuk Pairin's Government, argued that Datuk Pairin's resignation was personal to him and did not affect the Plaintiff's appointment as a Minister, which had never expressly been revoked. While the case largely turned on specific provisions of the Constitution of Sabah, the High Court (Sabah and Sarawak) also held that it was a 'well-established convention' that 'upon the death or resignation of the Chief Minister, the Cabinet stands dissolved'. 11 Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J held that Datuk Pairin's resignation must be deemed to include that of the whole Cabinet. He contended that only the Chief Minister who advised on the appointment of a Minister could advise upon his or her revocation of appointment. Hence, if the resignation of the Cabinet was not given effect by the resignation of the Chief Minister, the newly appointed Chief Minister would be unable to advise the Governor that other Members of the Cabinet be removed from office. 12 The Court considered that for Ministers to continue in office after the resignation of the Chief Minister would amount to a 'fetter on his discretion to advise the head of state as to the choice of the members to be with him in his Cabinet'. 13 Such an argument might have some resonance in Australia. If the resignation of a Prime Minister, even for 'personal' reasons, did not entail the resignation of his or her Ministry, then the newly appointed Prime Minister would be obliged to seek the resignation of Ministers whom he or she had not appointed, and if they refused to resign, to advise the Governor-General to dismiss them from office, which could give rise to significant controversy and bitterness 14 and might be regarded as an unreasonable fetter on a newly appointed Prime Minister.
2
Commonwealth practice The Australian Constitutional Convention in 1985 set out the following practice regarding the effect on the ministry of the termination of a Prime Minister's commission:
The resignation of a Prime Minister following a general election in which the government is defeated or following a defeat in It is not, however, an accurate description of the practices, as they have developed, nor is it particularly helpful, as reference to a ministry not being 'automatically' terminated tells us nothing about who decides upon whether or not it is terminated, by what criteria such a decision is to be made and whether it is consistent with constitutional principle.
The practice in Australia concerning the resignation of heads of government has varied over time and between the Commonwealth and the States. It has been the practice at the Commonwealth level since 1940 16 for the Prime Minister to resign after an election, even though his or her government won the election, in order to clear the ministry and to allow a new one to be sworn in after the Prime Minister is recommissioned. 17 Prime Ministers have also resigned and been re-commissioned when the party supporting the Prime Minister split or was reconstituted or a new coalition was formed, but the Prime Minister still retained the confidence of the House of Representatives. 18 In these cases the Prime Minister's resignation included that of the whole ministry.
The death of an Australian Prime Minister has also been regarded as terminating the offices of ministers, requiring the appointment of a new ministry, even if it was in much the same form as the previous ministry. The deaths in office of Lyons, 19 Curtin 20
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 15
Proceedings of the Australian Constitutional Convention, Brisbane, 1985, Vol 1, 416, Practice H ('Proceedings').
16
Prior to 1940 Prime Ministers generally resigned when defeated, either at an election (Deakin, Fisher, Cook and Bruce), in the House of Representatives (Deakin, Watson, Reid, Fisher and Scullin), or at a referendum (Hughes -who resigned but was reappointed in the absence of another viable government). Barton and Fisher resigned upon retirement to take up other posts. Ministries would continue through elections, as long as the government won and the Prime Minister stayed in office. Note that on 17 August 1904, Deakin was chastised by the Governor-General for failing to send a formal resignation letter when he lost office in April that year and was made to sign a back-dated one. In 1909 Andrew Fisher was required by the Governor-General to rewrite his letter of resignation as it was not in the 'proper form': Files of the Australian Constitutional Convention, ACC9 Item 6, Finemore Collection, University of Melbourne Law School ('ACC Files').
17
Menzies appeared to start this practice with his resignation and re-commissioning in October 1940, after the September election. Curtin continued the practice and apart from an aberration in 1961 when only specific Ministers resigned after the election -not Menzies -the practice of incumbent Prime Ministers resigning after winning an election and being reappointed with a new ministry has continued through to Howard and Gillard. See 
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and Holt, 21 show that even though an interim Prime Minister (Page, Forde and McEwen respectively) was appointed pending the choice of a new leader for the governing party, a full new ministry was appointed either upon the day that the interim Prime Minister was appointed or the following day. 22 There have been four occasions when a Prime Minister resigned after losing the support of his Cabinet or party colleagues: Menzies in 1941, Gorton in 1971, Hawke in 1991 and Rudd (throwing out the numerical symmetry) in 2010. 23 In the case of Menzies, a full new ministry was appointed on the date of Menzies' resignation and Fadden's appointment as Prime Minister. 24 It appears that his resignation was regarded as including the resignation of the full ministry.
In the case of the change from Gorton to McMahon, McMahon advised the Governor-General that the existing ministry should continue for the present. 25 It was therefore a choice made by the incoming Prime Minister to preserve the ministry for the time being. A new ministry was appointed 12 days later. 26 When Letter from Mr R J L Hawke to the Governor-General, 19 December 1991.
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Volume 39 ____________________________________________________________________________________ McMahon. Hawke's advice was accepted by the Governor-General and the full ministry was not vacated as a consequence of Hawke's resignation. Later on 27 December, Keating formed his first Ministry, not by resigning and seeking reappointment, but instead by undertaking a Cabinet reshuffle involving the revocation of appointments and the making of new appointments. Two new Ministers were sworn in as Executive Councillors, eleven ministerial appointments were revoked and twelve new ministerial appointments were made. 29 Rudd's resignation letter of 24 June 2010 was in exactly the same terms as Hawke's, with the only substantive changes being those of the relevant names. 30 It included the same statement about the intention to leave other ministerial appointments unaffected 'until such time as Ms Gillard, as Prime Minister, may advise'. The Government Gazette, which curiously broke with precedent by not recording Rudd's resignation, merely recorded the appointment of Gillard as Prime Minister. 31 Another Gazette notice recorded a minor reshuffle four days later affecting three Ministers. 32 No full ministry was appointed on that occasion either.
It therefore appears that as a matter of practice at the Commonwealth level, the resignation of the Prime Minister will include the resignation of all his or her ministerial colleagues unless the resignation is for 'personal' reasons and the outgoing Prime Minister expressly advises the Governor-General that the resignation of the full ministry is not intended or the incoming Prime Minister advises that Ministers are to continue under their current commissions. It is contended, however, that the better approach would be for the outgoing Prime Minister's resignation to include the resignation of the full ministry, subject to those Ministers continuing in office until replaced by a new ministry. This is more consistent with the constitutional principle that it is the Prime Minister who holds the commission to form a government and is responsible for the advice upon the appointment and revocation of ministerial appointments. Once that commission is terminated, the appointment of all ministers forming part of that government ought to be terminated, subject to a transitional caretaker period in which they continue to hold office until a new ministry is appointed. This ensures that the country is never without a government, but that the incoming Prime Minister is free to establish his or her own Government.
3
State practice Practice in the Australian States varies considerably. At one extreme, the New South Wales practice has been for the resignation of the Premier to include the resignation of all ministers, regardless of whether it is a resignation and re-appointment following an Letter from Mr K Rudd to the Governor-General, 24 June 2010. The only other change in the wording is that 'continue in office' in the Hawke letter is changed to 'remain in office' in the Rudd letter. Clearly the letter was drafted by a public servant copying from the earlier precedent, rather than one personally dictated by the Prime Minister. 
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337 ____________________________________________________________________________________ election win, 33 resignation following an election loss, 34 or a 'personal' resignation, be it voluntary retirement 35 or resignation due to loss of political support. 36 Although the Government Gazettes recording the transfers of premiership from Morris Iemma to Nathan Rees 37 and then to Kristina Keneally 38 only recorded the resignation of the Premier and appointment of the new Premier, each resignation letter stated that the Premier's resignation included the resignation of all his ministerial colleagues. 39 In each case a new ministry was appointed some days later. 40 It is not clear whether former Ministers continued in office on a caretaker basis until the new ministry was appointed or whether the new Premier held all ministerial offices during the intervening days before the new ministry was appointed. 41 At the other extreme is South Australia. There, the Premier's resignation does not involve that of all his or her Ministers where the resignation is personal or the Premier dies in office. 42 Instead, each Minister resigns separately (or if necessary, his or her commission is revoked by the Governor where there is a refusal to resign). 43 In South Australia, there is no practice of incumbent Premiers who win an election then resigning and seeking reappointment. Instead, the one government may continue across numerous Parliaments, until it is defeated or the Premier resigns. If a South Australian Premier resigns in circumstances where the government continues in office, only those Ministers who are subject to a portfolio change resign. Any Minister who retains the same portfolio under the new Premier continues in office under his or her old commission, rather than resigning and receiving a new commission. Hence when Premier John Olsen resigned in October 2001 and was replaced by Premier Rob Kerin, the only changes made were to the offices of Premier and Deputy Premier. 45 More recently, when Premier Mike Rann resigned in 2011 and was replaced by Premier Jay Weatherill, only those Ministers whose portfolios changed resigned. 46 Those who retained their portfolios continued in office under their old commissions. 47 The other States tend to sit between these two extremes and often show inconsistency within State practice. Queensland, 48 Victoria 49 and Western Australia 50 tend to follow the New South Wales approach of a new ministry being appointed after an incumbent Premier wins an election, although only those Ministers who are changing or losing portfolios usually resign. Ministers continuing in the same portfolio are simply reappointed without ever having resigned. The Tasmanian position is set out in s 8B of the Constitution Act 1934 (Tas), which provides that a Minister's term of office expires eight days after the return of the writs, unless he or she is reappointed by the Governor. In practice, the Premier resigns after the election and states that his or her resignation carries with it that of the entire ministry. If the incumbent Premier has won the election, the letter also then states that he or she is able to form a new Government and advises the Governor to offer him or her a new commission as Premier. 51 When it comes to the resignation of a Premier, voluntarily or involuntarily, the practice is inconsistent not only between States, but within States. For example, in 
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Victoria when Sir Henry Bolte and Sir Rupert Hamer resigned, both the Premier and the whole ministry resigned. 52 However, when John Cain resigned, his ministers did not. The Governor, on the advice of the new Premier, then accepted the resignation of some Ministers, appointed some Ministers and 'confirmed' other Ministers to continue in their existing portfolios. 53 When Steve Bracks resigned in 2007, the Governor accepted his resignation and that of another Minister and then appointed John Brumby as Premier. 54 Some days later, the Governor then accepted the resignation of Brumby and the ministry and then reappointed Brumby as Premier with a new ministry. 55 Western Australia also provides a mixed bag of approaches. When Sir Charles Court resigned, so did those ministers who were changing portfolios, but not those who kept the same portfolio. A full new ministry was appointed. 56 When Brian Burke resigned, the full ministry resigned with him and a new one was appointed. 57 When Peter Dowding resigned, three other ministers resigned and were reappointed, but there was no full new ministry approved. 58 When Geoff Gallop resigned, Alan Carpenter resigned too and then was appointed as Premier while continuing to hold his former portfolios. A full ministry was then listed as 'approved' by the Governor. 59 Inconsistent approaches are largely the result of a lack of continuity in the personnel dealing with the resignation of Premiers and the time-pressure of dealing with a surprise resignation or loss of leadership. Rarely is thought given to the constitutional principles at issue and how they ought to affect the relevant procedures. As a matter of principle, when the person who has been commissioned by the Governor to form a government dies or resigns, his or her commission ceases, as do the appointments of ministers made pursuant to that commission, subject to the fulfilment of caretaker obligations until a new government is formed under a new Premier (even if the ministry and the allocation of portfolios remain largely the same). The practice should reflect this principle.
B
Advice by an outgoing head of Government on his or her successor Before a Prime Minister resigns, does he or she have the right to advise the GovernorGeneral about whom to appoint as his or her successor? Does such advice have the status of advice from a constitutionally responsible minister, or does it have no greater status than informal advice proffered by an informed person? For example, what if Kevin Rudd, just prior to resigning as Prime Minister, had advised the GovernorGeneral to appoint Maxine McKew as Prime Minister, rather than Julia Gillard? What if he had done so before the caucus had held a meeting to decide the leadership of the party? To what extent is the Governor-General bound to act upon such advice or could she seek a delay until caucus had made its decision and then place reliance upon the decision of the caucus?
Lowell 
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Volume 39 ____________________________________________________________________________________ binding. 60 Forsey argued that it would be 'preposterous' for a defeated Liberal Prime Minister to advise the Governor-General to send for a Conservative other than the leader of the victorious Conservative Party. He also regarded such advice as unnecessary, as parliamentary parties now have mechanisms for choosing their own leaders and therefore the Governor-General's choice in most cases should be 'automatic'. 61 Marshall and Moodie set out three reasons why a Prime Minister could not advise the monarch on his or her successor. First, the Prime Minister would not be fully responsible to Parliament for the advice, as the potential sanction of loss of office would hold no fear for a Prime Minister who was leaving office anyway. Secondly, in the case of a defeated Prime Minister, he or she does not have the parliamentary authority to give binding advice. Thirdly, such an important power might be exercised in 'a highly partisan or even capricious way'. 62 Butler considered that it would be seen as 'outrageous' if the 'umpire had to act on the advice of one of the protagonists'. 63 Rasmussen went a step further, arguing that as someone 'can be invited to form a Government only when there currently is no Prime Minister', it is therefore 'impossible for the monarch to follow the convention to act on the advice of a responsible minister'. 64 He seemed to require concurrency between the act of the giving of advice and the act that it is advised that the monarch perform. 65 When the issue was considered by the High Court of Calcutta in 1967, Mitra J rejected the notion that the Governor is bound by ministerial advice in the appointment of the Chief Minister. He thought that it could not be said 'that the Governor is bound to act, in appointing a Chief Minister, on the advice of the outgoing Chief Minister who has lost his majority in the Legislative Assembly as a result of the General Election'. 66 Others have defended the notion of the outgoing Prime Minister advising the Governor upon his or her successor as a means of preserving the perceived independence of the Crown from politics. Brazier, for example, contended that 'it is preferable for the Queen to be advised whom to send for in order to preserve the comfortable notion that at the change of an Administration, an event which must be inextricably linked with party politics, the Queen still acts only on ministerial Note also Brazier's concern that if the Prime Minister gets the order of his or her statements wrong and resigns before advising the Queen on his or her successor, then such advice is not formal ministerial advice: Brazier, above n 7, 14. See also Butler, above n 63, 91. 
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341 ____________________________________________________________________________________ advice'. 67 Selway has argued that the outgoing Premier is 'entitled to advise the Governor' as to his or her successor, but that the 'Governor is not bound by that advice'. 68 In practice, outgoing Prime Ministers and Premiers do tend to advise upon their successor, but the status of this advice is usually regarded as not constitutionally binding. The Canadian Privy Council summarised the theory and practice as follows:
Advice to the Crown by the Prime Minister before resignation has, in Canada, been looked upon as a normal state of affairs, but constitutional opinion clearly indicates that the Crown, in exercising its prerogative in selecting a Prime Minister, is theoretically under no obligation to take the advice of the Prime Minister. In practice, of course, the Crown may have little alternative. 69 This is because it is usually quite clear who holds the confidence of the lower House. The Republic Advisory Committee was a little more equivocal, noting that the 'outgoing Prime Minister can usually be expected to advise the Governor-General of the party's choice and recommend the appointment of that person, although there is a question whether that recommendation amounts to binding "advice"'. 70 It also raised the concern that such advice from an outgoing Prime Minister might not be truly 'responsible' advice. 71 The problem is that there is a clash of conventions involved. On the one hand, the Governor-General is obliged by convention to commission as Prime Minister the person who is most likely to command the support of the House of Representatives. That person is almost always the person who leads the party or coalition which holds the most seats in the lower House. This convention has the potential to clash with another convention of responsible government -that the Governor-General acts on the advice of his or her responsible Ministers, primarily the Prime Minister. However, this latter convention does not apply with respect to the exercise of reserve powers, and the appointment of a Prime Minister has been generally regarded as the exercise of a reserve power. 72 Moreover, this convention cannot apply when there is no Prime Minister to advise because the Prime Minister is dead 73 80 However, the wisdom of requiring the Governor-General to assess the Prime Minister's 'good faith' is not apparent either. The Republic Advisory Committee concluded that 'although in Australia the outgoing Prime Minister's advice will be given and is unlikely not to be followed, there is not yet a fully accepted convention 
77
Killey makes the point that just because advice has routinely been given does not mean that it is relied upon or that the decision-maker considered himself or herself bound to seek and accept it: Killey, above n 61, 138. 
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343 ____________________________________________________________________________________ that that advice must be followed'. 81 Nor should there be, if this would override the fundamental convention of responsible government that the Prime Minister be the person who holds the confidence of the House.
C
Conclusion regarding effect of resignation and advice on successor The death or resignation of a Prime Minister will normally result in the vacation of all ministerial offices, subject to a transitional period of continuation in office of Ministers in a caretaker capacity until a new government is sworn in. In practice this has been subject to the caveat that where the resignation is 'personal' to the Prime Minister, the ministry may continue in office if the outgoing Prime Minister so advises and the incoming Prime Minister does not advise otherwise. The better view, however, is that once a Prime Minister surrenders his or her commission to form a government, through resignation, death or dismissal, the ministry is also vacated, subject to transitional arrangements.
As for advice by an outgoing Prime Minister regarding his or her successor, such advice is not the conventionally binding advice of a responsible minister and cannot override the convention that the person commissioned to be the Prime Minister shall be the person who holds the confidence of the House. The advice of the outgoing Prime Minister can only be regarded as informal advice which the Governor-General will take into account when assessing who is the person most likely to hold the confidence of the lower House. 82 In the end, the dismissal of a Prime Minister is a reserve power of the Governor-General which is not exercised on formal advice from anyone. 83 Would the Governor-General have good grounds to dismiss a Prime Minister who has lost the support of his or her parliamentary party, or would convention require the 
III REFUSAL OF THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT TO RESIGN
Federal Law Review
Volume
The loss of the leadership of a parliamentary party does not necessarily indicate loss of confidence of the lower House. Some of those who did not support Prime Minister Rudd in the caucus might have felt unable to vote no confidence in a Labor Prime Minister in the Parliament. The vote in the House would be confined to members of the House of Representatives, whereas the caucus also includes Senators, so there would be a different electoral college which could result in a different outcome, particularly where the caucus vote was close. Finally, it is possible that Members of the Opposition or independents might have voted to support Rudd as Prime Minister over the choice of the caucus (if for no other reason than to cause political instability). As Markesinis has noted, the Crown relies on fact not possibilities, in the exercise of its powers and would need 'clear and convincing evidence that the Prime Minister does not command a majority in the House' 85 before a reserve power would be exercised. A caucus vote would therefore not be sufficient to establish that a Prime Minister had lost the confidence of the House.
1
Letter from majority evidencing loss of confidence What if a majority of Members of the House of Representatives had written to the Governor-General swearing that they no longer had confidence in the Prime Minister and petitioning for his dismissal and the appointment of another Member as Prime Minister? Would this be a sufficient basis for the Governor-General to act?
The issue has arisen in a number of other countries with Westminster-style parliamentary systems. One example is the case of Adegbenro v Akintola 86 concerning the Western Region of Nigeria. Section 33 of the Constitution of Western Nigeria stated that Ministers held office during the Governor's pleasure, provided that the Governor shall not remove the Premier from office 'unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly'. On 21 May 1962, a letter was sent to the Governor by 66 members of the 124 member House of Assembly, stating that they no longer had confidence in the Premier and seeking his removal from office. The Governor then removed the Premier, Chief Akintola, from office, even though there had not been a vote of no confidence in the Premier in the House of Assembly. The Premier claimed he had been wrongfully removed. He had, in fact, sought to face the Parliament to obtain a vote of confidence, but the Speaker had refused to recall it. Akintola refused to go, forcing his way back _____________________________________________________________________________________ 84 Winterton, above n 72, 45-6; Killey, above n 61, 142. 
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345 ____________________________________________________________________________________ into his office, petitioning the Queen to remove the Governor, 87 and challenging the validity of his removal in the courts. The Federal Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the Premier had not been validly removed because there had not been a vote of no confidence or defeat of the Government in the House of Assembly on a measure of importance that would show that the Premier no longer had the support of a majority of the House of Assembly. 88 On appeal, the Privy Council took a different view. Their Lordships noted the difference between a written and unwritten constitution and the fact that the written Constitution of Western Nigeria did not set any limits, such as the requirement for a vote of no confidence, on the Governor's discretion to remove the Premier from office. The Constitution expressly permitted the Governor to act if 'it appears to him' that the Premier no longer commands the majority support of the House. Their Lordships observed that weight must be given to the fact that the Governor's power to remove was not limited to cases of votes of no confidence. 89 Their Lordships recognised the dangers inherent in a Governor acting without a vote of the House. They pointed out that expressions of opinion, attitude or intention upon such matters 'may well prove to be delusive' and that a Governor who relied upon them risked placing himself in 'conflict with the will of the elected House of Representatives'. In the end, however, their Lordships distinguished between good policy and the law. They concluded:
But, while there may be formidable arguments in favour of the Governor confining his conclusion on such a point to the recorded voting in the House, if the impartiality of the constitutional sovereign is not to be in danger of compromise, the arguments are considerations of policy and propriety which it is for him to weigh on each particular occasion: they are not legal restrictions which a court of law, interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution, can import into the written document and make it his legal duty to observe. To sum up, there are many good arguments to discourage a Governor from exercising his power of removal except upon indisputable evidence of actual voting in the House, but it is nonetheless impossible to say that situations cannot arise in which these arguments are outweighed by considerations which afford to the Governor the evidence he is to look for, even without the testimony of recorded votes. 90 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 87
The Queen declined to act upon his petition on the ground that as he was no longer Premier he could not advise her to remove the Governor. 
Federal Law Review
Volume 39 ____________________________________________________________________________________ The courts in Malaysia have taken varying views upon this issue. In 1966, the Governor of Sarawak requested that the Chief Minister, Stephen Kalong Ningkan, resign after the Governor received a 'top secret' letter from an apparent majority of Members alleging a loss of confidence in Ningkan. Ningkan refused, seeking to face the legislature to determine confidence by way of a formal vote. He was instead dismissed by the Governor. He challenged his dismissal. The Court overturned his dismissal, holding that only a vote of no confidence on the floor of the legislature was sufficient to support his dismissal. Acting Chief Justice Harley noted that 'men who put their names to a "Top Secret" letter may well hesitate to vote publicly in support of their private views'. 91 Since then, however, Malaysian courts have taken a more relaxed view about issues of 'no confidence' being determined upon evidence outside of a formal vote of no confidence, as long as the extraneous source of the evidence is 'properly established'. 92 The issue also arose in British Columbia in 1991. The Premier, Bill Vander Zalm became mired in a conflict of interest controversy. His parliamentary party wished to depose him as leader but was concerned that he would seek to dissolve Parliament and bring them down with him. They prepared affidavits that showed a majority of Vander Zalm's party, (which amounted to a majority of the House) no longer had confidence in Vander Zalm as Premier, and the leader of the caucus communicated this information directly to the Lieutenant-Governor, David Lam. After a formal report into Vander Zalm's conflict of interest was made public by the Conflict Commissioner, the Lieutenant-Governor persuaded him to resign. The Lieutenant-Governor later noted that he would have been prepared to dismiss Vander Zalm had he not resigned. It is not clear, however, whether the grounds for dismissal would have been Vander Zalm's alleged misbehaviour or his failure to resign in the face of a loss of confidence in his leadership, even though no vote of no confidence had been passed in the legislature. 93 Either ground would have been controversial if the same events were to have occurred in Australia. In the absence of some kind of judicial finding of illegality, there would have been criticism that the Lieutenant-Governor breached the separation of powers and usurped the role of the judiciary by making his or her own judgment of guilt. 94 In the absence of a vote of no confidence in the Parliament, there would be Opposition Leader, Charles Wade, proposed an amendment that it was not desirable at that time to determine confidence because of the war and that a 'National Party' should be formed to assist in the prosecution of the war effort. 98 He declared that he was proud to say that his party was not tempted by the 'very inviting bait' of securing government that 'a body of disgruntled gentlemen' saw fit to dangle before their eyes. 99 Wade's amendment was passed. Hence confidence had been raised but deferred, rather than determined, by the House.
The Governor, Sir Gerald Strickland, formed the view that in the absence of a positive vote of confidence, Holman could not remain as Premier. Holman had been commissioned on the basis that he was the Leader of the Labor Party and he no longer held that position. 100 Sir Gerald sent Holman a minute on 10 November seeking his resignation. Holman sought to consult his colleagues overnight. The next morning the headlines in The Sydney Morning Herald declared 'Sensational Political DevelopmentGovernor dismisses Premier'. 101 It outlined a 'semi-official statement of the Governor's action' which stated that 'because Mr Wade took control of the business of the House from the Premier, the Governor has informed Mr Holman that his Excellency will cease transacting business with Ministers, and is entitled to seek the advice of the strongest group in Parliament'. 102 Holman later said that he had been told by the Press that the publication of the minute was authorised by the Governor. 103 Holman saw the Governor and expressed his objections to the Governor's conduct. In particular, he argued that the Governor's only source of advice about proceedings in Parliament was the Premier and that the Governor therefore had no right to draw the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 95 See Taylor's view that 'dismissal should not occur until the opinion of the lower House has actually been expressed and an opportunity to resign has been given to the Premier': Greg Taylor, The Constitution of Victoria (Federation Press, 2006) 
Volume 39 ____________________________________________________________________________________ conclusions that he had concerning what had occurred in the Parliament. After further discussion, Holman and Wade advised the Governor that they would form a Ministry as part of a National Government for the course of the war. The Governor agreed that the constitutional incident was at an end. 104 However, the Governor then asked Holman to resign his commission in order to be reappointed and to form a new Government. The Governor insisted that he would not summon the Executive Council or sign important documents (such as assent to the Bill to prolong the life of the Parliament) until the new Ministry was appointed. 105 The Attorney-General provided an opinion that there was no obligation on the Premier to resign and that former Ministers who were no longer part of the Government could resign and be replaced individually upon the advice of the Premier. 106 Holman then advised the Governor that this was the course he proposed to take, and the change in Ministers took place without Holman having to resign, despite the Governor's objections. 107 The British Secretary of State responded to the Governor's justification of his actions by saying that he was 'surprised' by the Governor's interference in the absence of the successful passage of a no confidence motion and when the Premier had not advised that he was unable to govern. He was not aware of any authority for the Governor's view that Holman had to resign. He considered it obvious that this kind of intervention by a Governor must render the working of the constitutional machine extremely difficult. 108 Sir Gerald was shortly afterwards 'recalled' from his office as Governor and told that he could not return to Australia. 109 At the Commonwealth level, when the equivalent split occurred, there was less constitutional controversy. On 14 November 1916, the Labor Party removed Prime Minister Hughes from its leadership, appointing Frank Tudor instead to lead the parliamentary party. Hughes was followed by 13 Members of the House of Representatives and 11 Senators, who together with Hughes formed the 'National Labor Party'. Although a minority government, it was initially supported by the Liberal Party. Hughes took the more direct path by resigning as Prime Minister. He was then reappointed by the Governor-General with a reconstructed ministry. On 17 February 1917, Prime Minister Hughes again resigned, this time to join with the Liberal Party in forming the 'Nationalist Party'. He was again reappointed and established a new ministry. 110 Another example of a party split occurred in Queensland. On 24 April 1957, the Queensland Premier, Vince Gair, was expelled from the Australian Labor Party as a result of a union dispute and political power struggle. He continued for a short period as Premier, leading a party of 25 supporters who left the ALP with him. 110 See further: Sawer, above n 2, 133-4. See also the resignation and re-appointment of Prime Minister Lyons on 9 November 1934 in order to form a coalition ministry with the Country Party. 
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Advice from a leader lacking party support that ministers be dismissed or Parliament dissolved The Governor-General is ordinarily required to act on the advice of his or her responsible Ministers given through the Executive Council or through Ministers. With respect to executive matters, this advice is provided by the Prime Minister. The principle of Cabinet solidarity means that in ordinary circumstances the Prime Minister's advice is taken to be the advice of his or her Cabinet, although the Prime Minister may personally decide upon such matters as advice on the appointment of Ministers and advice on an election date, without taking these matters to Cabinet. 112 The Prime Minister's status as a responsible minister and capacity to advise the Governor-General depend, however, on his or her retention of the support of the lower House of the Parliament. 113 In some cases where a leader has lost support within his or her own party, he or she has attempted to reassert power and control over the party by advising that Ministers who oppose the will of the leader be dismissed or that Parliament be dissolved and an election held, against the will of the Cabinet. A question then arises as to whether the Governor-General should accept advice from a leader who no longer holds the confidence of his or her parliamentary party and how this is to be assessed. 114 For example, if Kevin Rudd, on the morning of 24 June 2010, had gone to see the GovernorGeneral before the caucus meeting to decide the leadership challenge against him, and advised her to dissolve Parliament, should she have accepted his advice?
Brazier has previously contemplated such a scenario, contending that if it occurred in the United Kingdom, the Queen would be justified in refusing to dissolve the Parliament 'if a Prime Minister, placed in a minority within his own Cabinet and threatened with repudiation by his parliamentary party, suddenly asked for a dissolution in order to forestall the prospect of his imminent supersession.' 115 Jennings has also contemplated such a situation, noting that if a Prime Minister resigns in order to reconstruct his or her government, the Queen is not compelled to ask the retiring Prime Minister to form a new Government. He observed that the 'Queen must not intervene in party politics' and must not, therefore, 'support a Prime Minister against Brazier also noted at 130: 'A fortiori, a Prime Minister who has actually been repudiated by his own parliamentary party in favour of one of his colleagues can claim no constitutional right at all to demand a dissolution.' Note that the Queen no longer has a role in the dissolution of Parliament -Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (UK).
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Federal Law Review Volume 39 ____________________________________________________________________________________ his colleagues'. He concluded that it would accordingly 'be unconstitutional for the Queen to agree with the Prime Minister for the dissolution of the Government in order to allow the Prime Minister to override his colleagues.' 116 Others, however, have applied the 'no political interference' principle the other way, arguing that the Queen should not interfere politically by refusing the advice of her Prime Minister unless Parliament establishes the absence of confidence. Winterton has contended that:
The convention against vice-regal interference in the internal affairs of the government is so strong that it is submitted that a Governor or Governor-General would be entitled to refuse to follow a Chief Minister's advice on the ground that it no longer represented the government's advice only if the Chief Minister's minority position in Cabinet or, perhaps, the governing party or coalition had been demonstrated on the floor of Parliament and, even then, probably only if it was clear that a majority of the members of the lower House did not support the Chief Minister. 117 Winterton has argued elsewhere that such a scenario is 'so fanciful as not to warrant serious consideration'. 118 However, he went on to give it consideration, observing:
If the House of Representatives were in session, a Governor-General faced with such a request [ie, a request to dissolve parliament against the wishes of the rest of the government], would be well advised to defer consideration of it until the House had had the opportunity to consider whether or not the prime minister still enjoyed its confidence. If the House were not in session, the Governor-General might suggest that the House of Representatives be recalled, warning the prime minister that the ultimate consequence of a refusal could be dismissal. 119 Winterton also suggested that the Governor-General might address the nation and call upon public opinion 'to bring the prime minister to his senses'. This, however, would be a far more dangerous course, as it would involve the Governor-General in a public conflict with his or her Prime Minister and potentially give rise to claims of partisanship.
Lumb, in contrast to Winterton, has argued that a Governor is entitled to decline to act on a Premier's advice (in this case to dismiss Ministers) where the Premier has lost the support of the majority of members of his or her Party or Cabinet. He considered that the Governor could refuse to act until the question of confidence is determined 'by a party vote and ultimately on the floor of the parliament'. He also thought that if the Premier persisted with such advice, the Governor could request the Premier to 'return his commission' on the ground that Parliament should decide confidence before the advice is acted upon. 120 Killey, however, has regarded this view as 'fairly extreme' and a misrepresentation of the Queensland Bjelke-Petersen precedent discussed below. 121 In most cases political pressures will be effective to resolve political crises without the need for a Governor-General to become directly involved. The Governor-General's power of delay (while formally seeking further information) is therefore a very _____________________________________________________________________________________ 116 Jennings, above n 2, 86. 117 Winterton, above n 3, 302. 118 Winterton, above n 72, 41. 119 Ibid 41-2. 120 Lumb, above n 2, 78. 121 Killey, above n 61, 183.
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351 ____________________________________________________________________________________ effective weapon as it gives time for political pressures to operate. 122 This may, indeed, be the true lesson of the Bjelke-Petersen case.
1
Lang and dissolution The two primary Australian examples of the tactic of seeking dissolution or the dismissal of Ministers arose in 1926-7 and 1987, through the eccentric (if not fanciful) protagonists, Jack Lang and Joh Bjelke-Petersen. Jack Lang's first term of office as Premier of New South Wales was turbulent and marked by a series of crises. Opinion within the Labor Party about Lang's leadership was sharply divided, with many seeing him as a saviour while many others, particularly from the rural areas, saw him as destructive, dangerous and incompetent. In September 1926, Lang was challenged for the party leadership by Peter Loughlin. The vote was tied, but Lang eventually won by obtaining Edward McTiernan's vote by telegraph from a ship on the high seas. 123 In November 1926 the ALP State Conference decided that the leadership of the party should be determined by the State Conference, rather than the caucus. This commenced a period known as the 'Lang dictatorship'. As caucus no longer had any power over the leadership, the only way it could bring Lang down was through a vote of no confidence in the Legislative Assembly.
Loughlin resigned from the Ministry and with two supporters attempted to bring down the Government. Although his attempt failed, it signalled significant dissent within Labor's ranks at Lang's leadership. As Hogan has noted: By early 1927, Lang's position in his own Caucus was untenable. A majority of its members demanded that Caucus be given back the right to choose its Leader -which would have seen Lang supported by only a handful of MPs. 124 Seeing a crisis brewing, the Governor, Sir Dudley de Chair, sought the advice of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Sir Philip Street, as to the circumstances in which he should agree to any proposal by Lang to dismiss his Ministers. The Chief Justice advised that it really depended on the circumstances, but that the Governor should not regard the Premier as being his sole adviser on the matter. He thought the Governor should summon a meeting of the full Executive Council to ascertain the opinions and wishes of the majority. 125 When Lang approached de Chair, he instead sought the Governor's agreement to a dissolution, but on the basis that it be kept secret so that he could make use of it when needed. De Chair said that he would only dissolve the Parliament openly and insisted on a meeting of the full Executive Council to decide the matter. Sir Philip Street advised the Governor not to dissolve the Parliament if it was against the wish of the majority of the Executive Council. 126 At the meeting, all but one of the Ministers objected to a dissolution. The Governor decided that he would not immediately 
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Volume 39 ____________________________________________________________________________________ dissolve the Parliament, in the face of the objection of the majority of the Cabinet. However, he then told Lang to resign and that he would reappoint him with a new Cabinet to act as a caretaker government until a new election could be held. 127 The election was held in October 1927, after a new electoral roll was prepared. Lang and his party lost government. Lang, however, remained leader of his party, despite its lack of support for him. Although the matter was decided in the end by the people, through an election, this example shows the importance of a Premier's power to advise a Governor on the dismissal of ministers and the dissolution of Parliament, if the Governor is prepared to support a Premier who has lost the support of his Cabinet and party.
2
Bjelke-Petersen and the dismissal of ministers In Queensland, a similar tactic proved less successful for Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen. In November 1987, in the midst of the Fitzgerald Royal Commission inquiry into corruption in Queensland, the Premier, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, fell out with senior figures in the National Party and lost the support of key Ministers. He proposed to regain control over his parliamentary party by dismissing five Ministers whom he regarded as disloyal. 128 He initially advised the Governor on 23 November 1987 that he wished to resign on behalf of his whole ministry and then be reappointed as Premier, leaving him free to restructure his ministry, reducing its size, excluding some former Ministers and reallocating portfolios. He had not advised his colleagues, despite holding a Cabinet meeting that morning. The Governor, Sir Walter Campbell, was concerned that the Premier might no longer hold the confidence of his Cabinet and his parliamentary party.
The Governor confirmed in writing the following advice that he had given orally to Sir Joh:
I advised you that, should you resign as Premier, it may be that I may not re-commission you as Premier unless I was of the view that you were able to form a new Ministry and that you would be able to obtain the confidence and support of the Parliament. 129 The Governor suggested to Bjelke-Petersen that it would be wise to discuss the restructure with his Ministers and seek the resignation of those whom he wished removed. Sir Joh returned to the Governor the following day, advising that he had placed letters of resignation in front of the five Ministers he proposed to dismiss, but all had refused to sign. He had not discussed the matter with his Cabinet. The Governor stated that he would not be rushed into action and sought a letter from Sir Joh setting out all the details including an account of his discussion with Ministers Later that day, after a Cabinet meeting, Sir Joh returned to Government House. He told the Governor that he had put the restructure proposal to the Cabinet. He now only sought the resignation of three Ministers, but all had refused. One, the Health Minister, Mike Ahern, announced that he was calling a party meeting to test confidence in the Premier. Sir Joh rejected this as an illegal meeting. Sir Joh formally advised the Governor to dismiss the three Ministers. The Governor finally accepted that advice and dismissed them from office. As Winterton has pointed out, the power to dismiss Ministers (other than the Premier or Prime Minister) is not a reserve power, so the Governor was ultimately obliged to act in accordance with the Premier's advice on this matter, after exercising his rights to warn and defer the matter pending the receipt of adequate advice. 130 On 26 November, the parliamentary party voted to replace Bjelke-Petersen as its leader with Mike Ahern. Ahern advised Government House that he had been elected as leader. Sir Joh advised the Governor that Parliament be recalled on 3 December (which was later moved to 2 December). Ahern then visited the Governor, delivering a letter that pledged the support of 47 National Party parliamentarians, being a majority of the House. He included an opinion by the Solicitor-General and another by legal counsel appointed by the National Party, to the effect that the Governor should appoint the new leader as Premier if it were clear that he commanded a majority in the House. 131 The Governor declined to dismiss Sir Joh on the basis of this letter. Barlow and Corkery have recorded that the Governor:
told Ahern that Parliament was the ultimate judge -what took place at a party meeting was not the deciding factor. Before commissioning anyone as Premier, the Governor would have to be satisfied that the person could form a Ministry and command the support of Parliament. 132 The Governor was supported in this approach by Buckingham Palace, with the Queen's Private Secretary, Sir William Heseltine, later confirming in writing his telephone opinion: that you would have been safe in withdrawing the Premier's Commission only when and if he had suffered a defeat in the Parliament itself. 133 There was some criticism of the Governor at the time for leaving the State in confusion and without an effective government until Parliament sat or the Premier resigned. 134 Most, however, regarded the Governor as behaving in a proper and considered manner. 135 
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Volume 39 ____________________________________________________________________________________ In the face of his loss of the party leadership, Sir Joh initially refused to resign. He thought that if the matter was to be determined by Parliament, the members of his party would support him rather than go to an election. 136 He also tried to gain support from the Opposition, but to no avail. Sir Joh finally submitted his resignation on 1 December, before Parliament sat. Ahern was sworn in as Premier, but was asked to seek a motion of confidence in his Government in the Parliament the following day. Although Sir Joh's letter of resignation had included the resignation of 'the other members of the Bjelke-Petersen Ministry', out of an abundance of caution the Governor formally dismissed the previous ministry, allowing Ahern to form his own ministry once he had worked out the portfolio allocation. 137 This example shows that a skilled Governor can on the one hand refuse to be manipulated by a leader who has lost the confidence of his or her party and exercise the right to be consulted and warn to great effect, while on the other hand not taking precipitate action in dismissing the leader, which would have changed the nature of the crisis into one concerning vice-regal powers. The Governor, instead, let the crisis resolve itself politically, either through the mounting pressure on the Premier to resign or the work of the Parliament. Although this took time and resulted in a period of disruption of government, it avoided the kind of constitutional trauma that would have been involved in the dismissal of the Premier.
C
The use of prorogation or refusal to recall Parliament to avoid loss of office The other tactic that might be used by a Prime Minister facing a likely loss of confidence in the lower House is the prorogation of Parliament to avoid such a vote or the refusal to advise the recall of Parliament if it has already been prorogued.
1
Prorogation It remains contentious whether a Governor-General or Governor has the reserve power to refuse advice to prorogue the Parliament, particularly when the prorogation is intended to avoid a vote of no confidence. Certainly, in the early days of Australia's constitutional history when Governors were still representatives of the British Government and held broad discretionary powers, a Governor could refuse advice to prorogue the Parliament. For example, in 1899 the Governor of NSW, Earl Beauchamp, refused advice by George Reid to prorogue Parliament, leading to the defeat of the Government. 138 Beauchamp took the view that Reid's request for a prorogation 'was a clever idea, but obviously a trick to use the prerogative of the Crown as a party move'. 139 William Holman, as Acting Premier of NSW, was also initially refused a prorogation in 1911, although later granted it after his government resigned and another government could not be formed. 140 149 The Government was aware of the fact that it could face a vote of no confidence at any time and asked the Governor on 14 December 1981 to prorogue the Parliament until 26 March 1982. The reasons given to the Governor for the prorogation of Parliament were: (a) that the Parliament was unstable and not conducive to proper consideration of the legislative programme; (b) that it would give the Government the time to analyse the results of the referendum on hydro-electricity in south-west Tasmania; and (c) that time was needed to clarify the funding situation with respect to the works programme, including energy development. 150 Sir Stanley accepted these grounds and prorogued the Parliament.
Sir Stanley later noted that although, in his view, the Governor has discretionary powers with respect to prorogation, 'the dominant factor in exercising that discretion must be the advice tendered to the Governor by his chief adviser, the Premier'. He considered that only in 'exceptional circumstances' would the Governor be justified in refusing that advice, although he accepted that one such case 'would be a request to prorogue Parliament when a motion of No Confidence is before the House'. 151 At that stage a motion of no confidence had not yet been initiated.
On 29 January the Tasmanian Government announced a change in policy to support the Gordon-below-Franklin dam proposal. This resulted in the Australian Democrat, Mr Sanders, declaring that he would support a vote of no confidence against the Government as soon as Parliament resumed. On 22 February, the Opposition leader, Mr Gray, sent to the Governor a petition signed by a majority of Members of the House of Assembly asking him to recall Parliament early on the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 148 The results of the referendum on 12 December 1981 were: Gordon-below-Franklin -54.72%; Gordon-above-Olga -9.78%; Informal (most of which were marked 'No Dams') - The question whether or not the present Government continues to have the support of a majority of members of the House of Assembly is not to be determined by any counting of heads outside the House and can only be resolved by constitutional procedures on the floor of the House. My Premier and Ministers therefore continue to be my constitutional advisers. In forming an opinion either in relation to the exercise of my powers to prorogue Parliament under Section 12(2) or subsequently to call it together earlier under Section 13(1A) constitutional convention requires that the advice tendered to me by my Premier and Ministers is the dominant consideration. 153 Sir Stanley noted that the Premier had advised him that there were good reasons why Parliament should not be recalled earlier. He was not prepared to use 'generalised statements' in a letter as the basis for taking the 'extreme step of rejecting the advice' of his Government. 154 When Parliament resumed on 26 March, a no confidence motion was passed and Holgate sought, and was granted, an election to be held in May. The Liberal Party won the election.
3
Refusal to recall Parliament Most commentators take the view that a Governor or Governor-General does not have a reserve power to recall Parliament without responsible advice or other statutory authority. Winterton, however, has suggested that while the power to recall Parliament is not at present a reserve power, there is a 'strong case' for it being added to the list of reserve powers, 'for otherwise incumbent Premiers could prolong their tenure in the face of a threatened no-confidence motion by refusing to advise the Governor to summon Parliament.' 155 Taylor has also argued that:
In circumstances in which there is some extraordinary emergency in the state, or there are real grounds for believing that the government no longer enjoys the confidence of the Legislative Assembly but refuses to meet it, it should indeed be recognised that there is a residual discretion in the Governor to call Parliament together even if ministerial advice to that effect is not forthcoming and there is no need for it to meet soon in order to ensure supply. 156 Taylor based this view on the principle that vice-regal action should be as minimal as possible in removing a constitutionally objectionable state of affairs and that the recall of the Parliament by the Governor is less intrusive than the dismissal of a Premier. Killey, however, has expressed greater scepticism about such a reserve power, noting that there are no precedents for it, apart from one doubtful one in British Columbia in 1882-3, where it was alleged that the Lieutenant-Governor had 'forced' the For the most part, the issue arises instead in relation to whether a Prime Minister may be dismissed from office for refusing to recall the Parliament, particularly when matters of confidence are at issue. Winterton has suggested that in circumstances where a Prime Minister had lost the support of his or her ministry and sought the dissolution of Parliament against the wishes of the ministry, if 'the House were not in session, the Governor-General might suggest that the House of Representatives be recalled, warning the prime minister that the ultimate consequence of a refusal could be dismissal'. 158 Forsey and Selway have also accepted that dismissal might be justified in circumstances where confidence is at issue and the Premier or Prime Minister refuses to recall the Parliament to deal with it. 159 In such cases, dismissal would be the last resort.
As noted above, the Governor of Tasmania, Sir Stanley Burbury, when faced with this issue, took the view that the advice of the Premier and Ministers was the dominant consideration, although he did appear to consider that there might be circumstances in which Parliament might be recalled early, without or despite advice. The Queensland Governor, when faced with the absence of confidence in Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, recommended that Parliament be recalled quickly, and it was.
The issue arose in a more acute form in India in 1967. After an election produced a hung Parliament in West Bengal, a coalition was formed and Mr Muckherjee was appointed as Chief Minister. On 6 November 1967, Dr Ghose resigned as a minister of the Government and claimed, along with other members of the Legislative Assembly, that the coalition Government no longer held the confidence of the Legislative Assembly. That same day, the Governor requested the Council of Ministers to recall the Legislative Assembly into session by no later than the third week of November to resolve doubts about confidence. The Governor's request was ignored. The Governor made further requests on 14 November and 16 November that the Legislative Assembly be recalled in November, but the Council of Ministers decided that it should not be recalled until 18 December. The Governor, apparently 'having regard to the acute famine conditions and lawlessness on a wide scale then prevailing in the State' took the view that confidence needed to be settled quickly. On 21 November 1967, the Governor dismissed the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers and appointed Dr Ghose as Chief Minister. The appointment of Dr Ghose was challenged in Mahabir Prasad Sharma v Prafulla Chandra Ghose. 160 Mitra J of the Calcutta High Court held that it was within the discretion of the Governor to dismiss the Chief Minister, as the Chief Minister held office at the Governor's pleasure. The power to appoint and dismiss the Chief Minister was conferred exclusively upon the Governor and was not subject to ministerial advice or control by the Legislative Assembly. 161 Further, the Governor's decision, in the circumstances, was not tainted with bad faith, as it was reasonable for the Governor to take the view that confidence should be established without delay. 162 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 157 Killey, above n 61, 181. 158 Winterton, above n 72, 41-2. 159 Forsey, above n 61, 23; and Selway, above n 42, 43. 160 
2011
Conventions Concerning the Resignation of Prime Ministers and Premiers
____________________________________________________________________________________
D
Conclusion regarding the exercise of discretion by a Governor-General Holders of vice-regal office in Australia have rightly been very wary of exercising reserve powers to resolve political crises in Australia. The uncertain scope of the reserve powers, however, has been to their advantage. A Governor-General, faced with a Prime Minister who has lost the support of his or her Cabinet or party may warn the Prime Minister that certain advice might not be accepted, such as advice to dissolve or prorogue the Parliament, and might advise the Prime Minister to take certain steps, such as consulting his or her Cabinet or recalling Parliament and seeking a vote of confidence. The Governor-General's power to seek further formal advice, which is in effect a right to delay acting on advice, might also be used to effect by letting the political pressures mount in such a way as to force a political resolution of a political problem. A Governor-General is perfectly justified in waiting to see the judgement of the lower House of the Parliament as to whether a leader holds the confidence of the House, rather than relying on a letter, petition or other evidence of loss of confidence. 163 Indeed, this would be the advisable course in most circumstances, if the Parliament is recalled within a reasonable period, rather than reliance on caucus votes or letters signed by a majority of Members. It places responsibility back in Parliament, which is in turn responsible to the people.
If Kevin Rudd had advised the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament on the morning of 24 June 2010, before the caucus vote on his leadership, she would have been entitled to defer consideration of his advice and to have sought further advice from him as to whether he had the support of the government. The ensuing delay would most likely have resulted in the crisis being resolved politically. If Rudd had refused to resign after losing the support of his caucus, the Governor-General would have been entitled to wait until the House of Representatives had been able to decide upon confidence. She would also have been entitled to refuse advice to prorogue the Parliament in such circumstances so that the matter of confidence could be quickly resolved.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 163 As far back as 1871, the Queensland Governor, the Marquis of Normanby stated: 'I shall always be found ready to pay the greatest deference to the opinion of parliament, but that opinion must be expressed by the majority of the Assembly in their legislative capacity, and not by a majority without the walls of the House of Assembly'. 
IV CONCLUSION
While these scenarios might all appear 'fanciful', it is still useful to explore them for two reasons. First, they help test and expose the basic constitutional principles and conventions that underlie the Constitution. Secondly, strange situations do occasionally arise in politics, as the various events of 2009-10 have shown, and it is preferable that such issues be explored objectively, away from the heat of politics and accusations of political bias. If the various parties to a future constitutional crisis understand those principles and how they are likely to apply, then it is less likely that they will push events to their extremes, avoiding the deepening of any crisis. If the constitutional conventions have been closely examined and are well accepted in their application, then it is less likely that they will ever need to be applied as the participants in constitutional conflicts are more likely to bow to the inevitable result and step back from the brink. Eugene Forsey, many years ago, noted that while precedents and authorities are helpful, they are not enough. He observed that 'we do have to use our heads' and not apply precedents or principles 'woodenly to any and every situation', lest the result be 'nonsense'. 164 Just because something has been done one way in the past, is not necessarily reason for doing it again in the same way in the future. The question should be whether the precedent or 'convention' is consistent with the fundamental constitutional principles of representative and responsible government, and how best to accommodate clashes between existing principles. In constitutional law, precedents, such as those discussed above, are useful because of what they reveal about the scope and application of fundamental constitutional principles. They help deepen our knowledge and understanding, but should never be applied rigidly or woodenly. 
